Security is becoming recognized as an important aspect of software development, leading to the development of many different security-enhancing techniques, many of which use some kind of custom modeling language. Models in these different languages cannot readily be related to each other, which is an obstacle to using several techniques together. The sheer number of languages is, in itself, also an obstacle to adoption by developers.
INTRODUCTION
Our society has rapidly become dependent on computers, and by extension dependent on computer software. Software failure can now have a huge impact on society. Over the years we have seen software failures with consequences ranging from the amusingly [8] , to the terrifyingly lethal [19] .
While most software failures are caused by software flaws being triggered unintentionally, some failures are the result of vulnerabilities being intentionally exploited. The total economic impact of software vulnerabilities over the last decade is huge (estimated in the tens of billions of dollars, Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. worldwide [5, 6, 7, 11, 17] ).
Developers (and experts) have begun to realize the importance of software security. Over the last several years a number of techniques that enhance security in software have emerged. Examples include secure development processes (e.g. SDL [10] and CLASP [21] ), as well as techniques such as misuse case diagrams [23] , attack trees [20] and modelbased techniques for inspection [16] . Our contribution to this area was the S 3 P process improvement method [2, 4] , and more recently the SHIELDS project [22] is creating a repository where developers and development tools can access shared security knowledge in the form of models.
We are particularly interested in model-based techniques that can be used with conventional software development methods. Models are often used in requirements elicitation, design, and architecture, and are referenced during implementation. UML is the most well-known modeling language that is used in this way, and the success of UML is a strong indication that developers find informal and semiformal modeling techniques useful.
Nearly all model-based techniques for software security have been developed with little or no consideration for how they combine with other techniques. As a result, the modeling languages can have very similar expressive power and similar goals, and sometimes contain the same kinds of information. This proliferation of independent languages can make it difficult to relate models (and parts of models) to each other (e.g. relating an attack to a vulnerability) and is a practical obstacle for those who want to use more than one model-based software security technique at a time.
In most techniques models are primarily or exclusively consumed by humans. As a result many languages lack the expressive power needed by automated applications. For example, Telecom SudParis has developed a technique that performs automatic testing based on annotated vulnerability cause graphs [13] , but limitations in the VCG language lead to higher false positive rates than desired.
In this paper we present a modeling language, the security goal model (SGM) language, that can be used in place of attack trees, security activity graphs (SAG), vulnerability cause graphs (VCG), and security goal indicator trees (SGIT). SGMs can be made more precise than models in earlier languages, which makes them suitable for use not only in manual applications, but also in automated ones such as testing or static analysis.
Models in the traditional languages can be transformed to SGMs, and SGMs can be viewed using any of the traditional notations. This means that developers familiar with the older notations need not learn the SGM language unless they need the improvements the new language provides. Practical use of the SGM language is supported by a data model, presented in section 2, that permits rich interconnections between various kinds of security knowledge and security models. This data model also enables reuse of modeling results, a key aspect of the modeling process.
The SGM language itself is introduced in section 3 through a series of examples. The language is fully defined in section 4. The transformation to and from traditional languages is discussed in section 5.
CORE CONCEPTS
Practical use of the security goal model (SGM) language is enhanced by the ability to re-use and interconnect fragments of security knowledge and related models. Our definition of the SGM language on the assumption that a data model with the properties of the one described here is used.
A core element represents some kind of security-related knowledge, such as a security goal, a vulnerability, a securityrelated activity, a vulnerability cause, or a threat. Two core elements may not represent the same thing.
A model is a formal description of some aspect of a core element. For example, a model can describe how to perform an attack, what causes a vulnerability, how a goal can be fulfilled, or a how to test for a security property. Models consist of model elements, such as vertices and edges, which in turn may be connected to core elements.
Core elements and models are associated with each other through model associations. Each model association connects one core element to one model and indicates the nature of the relationship through a role attribute.
Core elements can be related to each other through core element associations. Each core element association connects two core elements and indicates the nature of the relationship through a role attribute. For example, an attack could be related to a security goal with the role threatens to indicate that the attack threatens the fulfillment of the goal.
In practice, these basic elements should be stored in a database so that the structure formed by the their relationships (model and core element associations, and links between model elements and core elements) can be traversed and queried.
Relations between core elements, models and model elements can create a rich net of interconnections that allow developers to relate different fragments of security knowledge to each other in a useful and meaningful way. Figure 1 visualizes how several items could be related to each other. Starting in the upper left, there is a core element, an attack named steal passwords. An attack tree models how to perform the steal passwords attack. This attack tree, in turn, contains two sub-attacks (copy password file and SQL injection). The former can be mitigated by achieving a goal (secure passwords storage) and the latter exploits a specific kind of vulnerability (SQL injection). That vulnerability, in turn, can be detected using static analysis rules, and its causes are described in another model. One of the causes, in turn, is related to an activity that prevents it.
The models themselves also contain relations between the elements. These are not shown in figure 1 . 
SECURITY GOAL MODELS
SGMs model how a given goal can be achieved. In this context a goal is anything that affects security or affects some other goal. Typical examples are vulnerabilities, security functionality, security-related software development activities, and attacks. A SGM is a directed acyclic graph. Vertices refer to core elements and represent subgoals; solid edges represent dependencies between subgoals; and dashed edges can be thought of as modeling information flow. The modeling language is fully defined in section 4. Figure 2 shows an attack tree and corresponding SGM for an attack on an on-line software distribution service. The root of the SGM, at the bottom of the graph, is the goal (a successful attack), and the remaining elements are subgoals. Subgoals drawn with angled sides are also modeled using SGMs. The attack tree is larger than the SGM and includes several duplications (in particular the influence person subgoal is repeated three times, with two variations). Figure 3 shows an SGM for a buffer overflow vulnerability. The model as a whole shows how the vulnerability can be caused. Subgoals drawn in black are counteracting subgoals, things that counteract the vulnerability (e.g., the use of adaptive buffers counteracts this type of buffer overflow). The corresponding VCG would look very similar, but would not include the information flow that clarifies the precise relationships between elements of the model. Figure 4 shows part of an SGM for the security property secure password management and subgoal password quality is checked. Again, the black subgoal represents something that counteracts the overall goal (in this case, allowing user name and password to be the same indicates that password quality is not checked). The corresponding SGIT would be larger, since some elements would be duplicated, and would not include information flow.
These three examples illustrate how SGMs can model attacks, vulnerabilities and security properties. In all cases the SGM is more precise (through the use of information flow), more compact, and at least as readable than the corresponding attack tree, VCG, or SGIT. 
THE SGM LANGUAGE
The definition of the SGM language consists of a syntactic domain and abstract syntax (elements that make up a model and how they can be combined), a visual representation (the symbols we use in the models), and a semantic transformation from the syntactic domain to a semantic domain. For a complete treatment of these terms as applied to modeling, see 'Meaningful Modeling: What's the Semantics of "Semantics"' [9] . In this paper we do not provide a formal semantic transformation, as this is of limited use to people Figure 5 shows the abstract syntax for the SGM language. Elements with italicized names are abstract and cannot appear directly in models. All generalizations are disjoint and complete unless otherwise specified. Only required attributes are included in the figure.
Syntax
The Root is a vertex that is reachable through dependence edges from all subgoal elements. The root cannot have any successors through dependence edges.
A Subgoal represents a goal that contributes or counteracts the overall goal that the security goal model models. Every subgoal must be associated with exactly one core element and has at most one predecessor and at least one successor through dependence edges. A single model can contain several subgoals, both contributing and counteracting, that reference the same core element.
Operators represent logical combinations of dependencies, either And or Or. Every operator must have at least one predecessor through a dependence edge and exactly one successor through a dependence edge.
An Annotation is an arbitrary comment. Annotations may be associated with other model elements through AnnotationEdges.
A DependenceEdge is a directed edge that represents any kind of dependence between subgoals and/or operators. An edge from A to B indicates that in order to fulfill the overall goal, both A and B must be fulfilled (assuming they are counteracting). The reason for a dependence edge can be specified using stereotypes.
A Stereotype is an annotation on a edge, usually a dependence edge, used to explain why the edge exists. While the reason for including an edge does not affect whether the overall goal is fulfilled or not, it can make the graph easier to understand. Table 1 lists the stereotypes we have identified to date. Subgoals can have one or more InformationPorts. Each port is either an InputPort, which represents some information used in the subgoal, or an OutputPort, which represents information produced by the subgoal. The unchecked integer arithmetic subgoal in figure 3 shows how information ports can be used: the subgoal has an input port representing operands and an output port representing the result.
Information ports can be connected using InformationEdges, which are used to add constraints to individual subgoals. For example, the edge from secure creation of passwords to password quality is checked in figure 4 signifies that the it is the securely created password's quality that is to be checked, not some other password.
An information edge is directed and may originate at any port, but must terminate at an input port. An edge from A to B signifies that the information at port B is the same as the information at port A, provided that A and its dependencies are fulfilled.
Input and Output vertices link the ports of core elements to their models. If a subgoal E is modeled by SGM G, then G contains one input vertex for each input port of E, and one output vertex for each output port of E. Every input vertex has one output port and every output vertex has one input port. The Model, CoreElement, and ModelElement elements are discussed in section 2. Elements SGMElement, Vertex, and Edge are abstract, and thus never instantiated directly. The SGM element represents an entire SGM.
Visual representation
Elements in the syntactic domain are visually represented as shown in table 2. Subgoals and dependence edges were chosen to be similar to corresponding elements in attack trees, VCGs, SAGs, and SGITs. Operations are similar to at least one attack tree notation. The design of the information edge was chosen to be visually distinct from dependence edges (bent, not straight, dashed, not solid). The dashed line reflects that information edges are less crucial to the model than dependence edges. The design of inputs and outputs are inspired by notation used in the Taverna workflow system.
Semantics
The semantics of the SGM language are presented informally since this kind of definition is more useful to most potential users than the formal definition of the language is. The informal definition is also sufficient for most who develop applications that process SGMs. The formal definition is omitted due to space restrictions.
Satisfying subgoals.
A subgoal that is not modeled using an SGM is satisfied if real-world conditions match its description. Determining if a subgoal is satisfied can be done manually. Automatic determination requires the core element the subgoal references to be specified formally in some way that can be processed Port type indications: src is an output port and dst is an input port. These indications are optional.
Input (named input) and output (named output).
automatically (e.g. static analysis rules). The data model described in section 2 enables specifications to be associated with core elements. When determining if a subgoal is satisfied, the value(s) of its information port(s) may be taken into account. The definition (natural language or otherwise) of the subgoal must indicate how the inputs should be used. If a subgoal is modeled using an SGM, it is satisfied if its model is satisfied.
Subgoal vertices.
A vertex in an SGM (i.e. a contributing or counteracting subgoal) can be true or false. A contributing subgoal is true if the following conditions are met: a The vertex is not the target of a dependence edge or the source of the dependence edge the vertex is the target of, is true.
b The subgoal the vertex references is satisfied.
A counteracting subgoal is true if the following conditions are met: a The vertex is not the target of a dependence edge or the source of the dependence edge the vertex is the target of, is true.
b The subgoal the vertex references is not satisfied.
Information ports, edges, inputs and outputs.
The values of an information port are valid relative a given context. A context is recursively defined as ∅ or C · G, where C is a context, and G is a subgoal (where · denotes concatenation).
If E is an information edge from S to D, then the value of E in context C is the value of S in context C (edges take on the value of their sources).
If P is an input port associated, and Predecessors is the set of information edges to P , then the value of P in context C is the union of the values of all edges in Predecessors (ports take on the values of their incoming edges).
If I is an input in model M corresponding to input port P , then the value of I in context C · G is the value of P in context G. The value of the output port of I in context C is the value of I in context C (input vertices take on the values of the corresponding input ports).
If O is an output with input port P , then the value of O in context C is the value of P in context C (outputs take on the value of their input ports).
If G is a subgoal referencing core element E, P is an output port of E, and E is not satisfied, then the value of P in context C is ∅ (output ports of unsatisfied subgoals have no value).
If G is a subgoal referencing core element E, M is a security goal model of E, P is an output port of E, and O is the output in M corresponding to P , then the value of P in context C is the value of O in context C · G (output ports take on the value of the corresponding output vertex).
If G is a subgoal referencing core element E, E is not modeled using an SGM, and P is an output port of E, then P has a value in context C, but the value cannot be determined from the SGM alone. Other definitions of E, such as natural language or vulnerability detection conditions, may give more precise definitions of the value of P (outputs are determined by the specification of the subgoal).
CONVERSIONS AND VIEWS
The SGM language was developed in part to reduce the number of modeling languages used in software security. Although SGMs have a clear advantage in expressive power, the existing languages have the advantage of familiarity.
We have defined transformations to and from attack trees, VCGs, SAGs, and SGITs so that developers can use familiar notation to create and use SGMs; regretfully these cannot be included here due to space restrictions. Any model expressed using one of the earlier languages can be transformed to an SGM without loss of fidelity. SGMs can be transformed to earlier notation provided that certain reasonable constraints are met (e.g. an attack tree cannot be used to model how to perform software inspection). Information, such as information edges, that cannot be represented in the target language is lost.
The ability of an SGM to accurately represent models created in other languages means that the SGM language can also be used as a way to store models in e.g. a shared repository, such as that developed in the SHIELDS project.
A large SGM with fully connected information ports can appear quite cluttered. When information edges are not important (e.g., information edges can be ignored when using the model to determine how to prevent a vulnerability), SGMs can be displayed with only dependence edges.
Other types of visualization are also possible, such as showing the information edges incident on a particular vertex, or showing the transitive closure from (or to) a given port. The more complex a model becomes, the more such visualization techniques can benefit users.
RELATED WORK
Attack trees have been used for over a decade, and were originally defined by Schneier [20] . The semantics of attack trees were recently formalized [14] . SGMs improve on attack trees in two ways. Information edges allow more precise definition of how attacks are combined and make it possible to abstract certain attacks (e.g. the influence attack in figure 2. The ability to model subgoals using SGMs improves reuse for the security expert, and allows details of attacks to be hidden when not needed.
VCGs and SAGs are designed for software process improvement. For this application SGMs provide a unified language that improves on the readability of the originals. Furthermore VCGs have recently been used for automatic testing [13] and are being used in static analysis. These applications benefit greatly from the added precision provided by information edges.
SGITs are designed to support manual inspection [16] . The current specification of SGITs does not clearly specify the syntax or semantics of the model ad these are not needed for the intended application. SGMs have the same intuition as SGITs, but are defined in a more stringent manner. The added precision provided by information edges could be exploited in software inspection support tools.
VCGs, SAGs, SGITs, and attack trees (and SGMs) can be considered fairly informal languages. More precise and general modeling languages do exist. A prime exponent is the modeling language used in Secure Tropos [15] . Secure Tropos is a security extension of the Tropos methodology [3] . Tropos is a comprehensive agent-oriented software engineering methodology that adopts the i* modeling framework [25] . Approaches like Secure Tropos and frameworks like i* target a different audience than we do with SGMs. The SGM language is designed to be easy to use, easy to understand, and sufficiently familiar to users of earlier languages that it is easy to adopt. It is intended to support developers using conventional methods, not developers capable of adopting methods like Secure Tropos. It should also be noted that SGMs (and the languages it can replace) are designed primarily to support and improve development processes, whereas methods like Secure Tropos are development methods in and of themselves.
There are a large number of security-related modeling languages with specific application areas. For example, there are languages to describe access control [1] , trust relationships [24] , misuse cases [18, 23] and much more. One of the more comprehensive languages is UMLSec [12] , which allows developers to integrate security into most UML diagram types. With UMLSec it is also possible to check that a model is internally consistent.
These approaches are only marginally related to the work in this paper. However, the use of core elements to represent discrete items of security knowledge make it possible to relate an SGM to relevant models in other languages and vice-versa. For example the secure password management goal could be related to a UMLSec model of a typical implementation, and a vulnerability present in an extended misuse case diagram could be related to an SGM showing the causes of that vulnerability.
CONCLUSIONS
Software security is often approached using some kind of model-based method. Models are useful when expressing complex concepts and dependencies, and developers are familiar with the use of models, particular semi-formal ones, from using UML and similar languages.
In this paper present the security goal model (SGM) language, which can be used in place of four earlier securityrelated modeling languages: attack trees, vulnerability cause graphs, security activity graphs, and security goal indicator trees. The SGM language also improves on the ability to express detailed relationships between model elements, which is necessary for applications that are completely or partially automated (e.g. software testing or static analysis). Attempts to use earlier languages for these applications show promise, but the lack of expressive power has translated into lack of precision, e.g. high false positive rates.
Since the earlier languages are fairly well established and users may prefer these to an unfamiliar notation, we have defined translations from the earlier languages to SGMs and vice-versa. The loss of information that is inevitable when translating from SGMs is limited to those relationships that cannot be expressed in the less capable languages. The ability to transition to and from previously existing languages also means that SGMs can be used as a common representation format for models created and intended to be used in other notations. A common format such as this supports the development of tools to create, view, and process models.
To support practical use of the SGM language we have developed an underlying data model that permits rich interconnections between all kinds of security knowledge. This makes it possible to relate elements in one kind of model to elements (or models) in another, which supports the combined use of security techniques such as misuse case diagrams, attack trees and software process improvement, that were developed independently of each other. Some of these techniques can also benefit from using SGMs directly.
The SGM language definition is essentially complete, but we will continue to refine it based on experiences from evaluations and actual use. We have defined a modeling method (omitted from this paper due to space restrictions) that we will also continue to refine. Finally, we are working in collaboration with other groups on applications of SGMs, including static analysis (we are developing a static analysis tool that uses SGMs in which individual elements are formally defined using Datalog) and automatic testing (continuation of Telecom SudParis' work on VCG-based testing).
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